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Abstract 
Many humanistic and social disciplines are naturally inclined to 
seek for human-, person-, self- centered focus, and develop a holis-
tic theory of such. Such disciplines continually engage with philo-
sophical, metaphysical and meta-theoretical perspectives. This en-
gagement often leads to a singular focus on the necessity of a “grand 
unified theory” at the expense of any and all alternative perspec-
tives. Properties of grand theories are discussed on the examples of 
Giddens and Bourdieu. It is argued that grand theories hamper a 
more productive focus on concrete phenomena. Robert Merton’s 
focus on “middle range” theories is revisited and its continuing rel-
evance is highlighted. The level of abstraction characteristic of such 
theories, as well as the way they engage with the empirical social 
reality, are discussed. The article concludes by considering the para-
doxical reductionism that can be observed in presumably the most 
anti-reductionist grand theories.
Keywords Grand theory, methods, middle range theory, phenom-
enology, social psychology
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The perennial quest of the humanities and the social sciences is to 
understand what has alternately been called the soul or the mind, 
and to figure out what it means to be human and to live in a social 
universe. In the seventeenth century, Descartes had conveniently 
dissociated the mind and the body, opening the way to scientifically 
studying human biology and physiology while preserving the reli-
giously-coveted metaphysical status of the soul. With the advent of 
materialism, Cartesian dualism has come under fire, while the 
question has been eventually refashioned in terms of understand-
ing the human brain. Today, in the age of neuroscience, scientists 
often quip that the ultimate challenge for the human brain is to un-
derstand itself. Does it mean, however, that the outcome of these 
efforts is necessarily a grand unified theory of everything human?
We argue that the succession of grand theories (GT) in the so-
cial, psychological, and behavioral sciences is not progressive, 
does not inspire critical debates, and has not been able to advance 
empirical research. Conversely, many GTs have shown marked 
antipathy to data. As an alternative, drawing on examples from 
social psychology, we propose to revisit Robert Merton’s concept 
of theories of the middle range (MRT) that focus on empirically 
accessible phenomena.
The world according to grand theories
A classic description of the relation between research and theory 
assumes that the process starts with some kind of philosophical on-
tological commitment, and moves from there to theory. Theory then 
deductively moves to research design. Late twentieth century has 
seen a resurgence of grand paradigms in humanities such as Fou-
cauldian poststructuralism and Gadamerian hermeneutics (Skin-
ner 1990) that claimed a split from the natural sciences and posited 
overarching schemes aimed at understanding individual facts and 
events in their terms.
A true GT focuses on the logical and conceptual relation between 
the theoretical postulates, models or logical abstractions, that are 
accorded an essential role within its universe. GTs see the world as 
an expression of interconnected “grand structures” perceived and 
understood through theoretical thinking. A field characterized by 
fragmented theoretical propositions must be immature and possi-
bly in crisis. Since research is seen as inherently deductive, a pur-
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ported theoretical crisis can only be addressed through more the-
ory. The epistemic status of GTs is often construed as privileged, 
which is to say, a GT does not commonly contain any clearly de-
fined independent truth criterion. At best, many such theories im-
plicitly adhere to a “coherence” theory of truth, that is, incorporate 
statements that associate with other statements already contained 
in a theory. In practice, this means that true GT can never be rejected 
on empirical grounds alone. On the rare occasions where GTs pro-
pose predictions, failures tend to be seen to stem from imperfect-
ness of evidence. Under this view a true GT generates understand-
ing, illuminations and insights, an approach to the world, a method 
to seek and find sense and accommodate new phenomena within a 
totality of a theoretical narrative.
Case study: Giddens and Bourdieu
A case study in how GTs operate is offered by two well-known the-
ories of society commonly taught as required part of bachelor cur-
ricula in humanities and in psychology, including in Denmark. 
Both purport to explain the nature of social relationships, the role of 
the individual, and the degree of individual freedom.
Anthony Giddens (1984) proposed the so-called structuration 
theory, postulating a duality of social structure and individual 
agency. He himself emphasized that his theory “will not be of much 
value if it does not help to illuminate problems of empirical re-
search” (Giddens 1984, xxix). Yet, as Gregson (1989) observed, 
structuration theory failed to provide either workable guidelines or 
empirically-relevant concepts. The best response to Gregson’s cri-
tique seems to be that the theory can work as a “‘sensitizing device’ 
that encourages researchers to take human consciousness and eve-
ryday life seriously” (Warf 2011, 183). Tellingly, Giddens’s own re-
cent work on climate change (Giddens 2011) proceeds without as 
much as a passing mention of structuration.
While Giddens tried to salvage limited freedom of action, Pierre 
Bourdieu aimed at showing the ultimate dependence of the indi-
vidual on the social position they occupy, for example in the form of 
his famous study of reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). 
Yet he soon produced a GT of his own, and in his debates with crit-
ics he accused them of an “epistemology of resentment” which al-
lows its advocates to “prohibit others from doing what they them-
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selves are unable to do, so that they can impose their own limits on 
others” (Bourdieu 1990, 35). This defensiveness has not been unique 
to Bourdieu, of course, but it shows clearly the kind of conundrum 
that grand theorizing faces with respect to evaluation of its validity.
Interestingly enough, the advent of postmodernism and its cri-
tique of “grand narratives” (Lyotard 1984) has, rather than toning 
down grand theorizing, led to an even broader explosion of theo-
retical work on themes like deconstruction and discourse. Indeed, 
judging by back covers of countless books, one consequence of 
postmodern liberation of thought from systematic structures of ra-
tionality and logic seems to have been that any conceptual combi-
nation could now claim the status of a radically new approach to 
any domain of reality, with an arbitrarily postulated scope and am-
bition. But does the blooming of a thousand theoretical flowers ac-
tually represent advancement of science, and especially science ori-
ented at concrete empirical phenomena?
Theories of the middle range and the empirical challenge
Robert K. Merton (1968) has proposed the idea of theories of the 
middle range. This idea originated in understanding that grand the-
ories are not necessarily wrong or misleading so much as potentially 
premature. While Merton longed for direct confrontation between 
grand theories in sociology and social psychology, he suspected that 
currently possible theories suffer from a great divide between theo-
retical arguments and questions that realistically can be answered 
through actual and possible research. To promote the latter, Merton 
identified theories that involve sets of ideas and concepts that nei-
ther are as abstract as GTs, nor as specific as individual empirical 
research protocols. Their main purpose is to connect empirical en-
deavors across a number of different research contexts using logical 
and conceptual abstractions or models. As Merton noted, such con-
nection is akin to “the same modest and limited development of 
ideas which occurred in the early modern period of other sciences, 
from natural history to chemistry and physics” (Merton 1957, 108). 
Merton saw MRTs as the middle way between the hasty progression 
of GTs from a limited number of abstract concept to arcane networks 
of theoretical statements (the kind witnessed, for instance, in the de-
bates on structuration theory), and the theoretically low-level accu-
mulation of individual empirical records and hypotheses.
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The empirical challenge presents the counterpart to theoretical 
proliferation especially in the domain of quickly emerging and 
changing methods. In psychology and brain sciences this has be-
come especially evident since 1990s, with the advent of modern 
methods of brain scanning (such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging, fMRI) as well as the mass accessibility of computational 
power necessary for analyzing data from already known methods 
such as electroencephalography (EEG). 2010s have likely added a 
further democratization of analytic expertise and skills in that com-
puter analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. What previ-
ously required expensive software (such as IBM SPSS) and spe-
cialized training can now be mounted on end-user machines using 
free programming environments like R and Python, which come 
with inexhaustible supply of Internet-based documentation, train-
ing, and expert community advice. Furthermore, the social and be-
havioral sciences in 2010s are seeing an explosion of interest in the 
so-called Big Data, which essentially means applying exploratory 
statistics and machine learning algorithms to all sorts of data about 
human behavior that gets automatically collected during routine 
activities of the “Internet of Things.” Examples of such “naturally 
occurring behavioral data” (to extend a term often used in some 
strands of qualitative research, e.g. by Silverman 2013) include pub-
lic Twitter feeds and municipal statistics made public by many local 
governments across the world (e.g., by the city of Aarhus in Den-
mark – http://www.smartaarhus.eu/projects/open-data-aarhus). 
Even more naturally occurring data is available to commercial 
agents such as retail corporations that collect consumer data. This 
proliferation blurs the traditional distinctions between discipline-
specific kinds of data (e.g., the claims of psychology to psychomet-
ric tests or the claims of neuroscience to EEG), and underscores the 
necessity of middle range theories to address the quickly changing 
landscape of empirical research.
Contrary to what the adherents of grand theorizing generally pre-
suppose, much of scientific innovation has in the past century been 
primarily driven by methodological breakthroughs rather than by 
creating new GTs. Thus, Greenwald (2012) has observed that most 
Nobel Prizes in the sciences have been awarded for essentially 
methodological advances. He contends that quite a number of very 
ambitious theoretical controversies in cognitive and social psychol-
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ogy, such as the debate between rationalistic and heuristic models of 
reasoning, have either never been resolved, or, as happened to a mi-
nority of them, have shown signs of resolution primarily due to 
methodological and research-technological solutions. For example, 
according to Greenwald (2012, 105), brain scanning was essential in 
supporting a multiple systems account of mental categorization. 
This represents a productive interplay between empirical experi-
ments and theories of the middle range that apply to a particular 
domain of cognition, rather than a top-down resolution by a grand 
theoretical schema. In terms of White and Poldrack, this is an exam-
ple of different models of cognitive processes producing a behavio-
ral mimicry, that is, the state where “the same data can be produced 
by each type of model” (White and Poldrack 2013, 79). They note 
that the function of brain imaging in this case is that of constraining 
theoretical models and provide differential support for them.
A proper theory of the middle range has the ability to combine 
what on the surface seems to be different empirical phenomena. 
This produces an account of a concrete domain of human behavior 
or function on a particular scale. One well-known example of MRT 
in social psychology is the role-set theory. According to Merton,
“Role-set theory begins with the concept that each social 
status involves not a single associated role, but an array of 
roles. This feature of social structure gives rise to the con-
cept of role-set: that complement of social relationships in 
which persons are involved simply because they occupy a 
particular social status.” (Merton 1968, 42)
Without engaging in broad debates about the nature of social struc-
ture or the relationship between structure and agency, role-set the-
ory was able to put together findings in several areas of workplace 
research. MRTs thus work as a kind of guide for the design and in-
terpretation research in social science, humanities and last but not 
least, psychology.
Abstraction as a tool of the middle range
MRTs proceed by using relatively limited conceptual abstractions 
across a select number of empirical domains. Pawson (2013) dis-
cussed this procedure at length, and it is worth recapping here. The 
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key to abstraction is integrating key features of a phenomenon 
across a number of occurrences. Abstractions of the middle level 
enable us to identify and understand specific occurrences as an ex-
pression of a more general instance. In doing so, we subscribe to a 
kind of middle-range conceptual realism: we attempt to go beyond 
pure association, or clustering, of observable features, to arrive at 
domain-applicable concepts that differentiate between broad class-
es of phenomena. Importantly, these allow inclusion as well as ex-
clusion of superficially similar occurrences.
An example of such procedure is differentiating between three 
classic middle-range social-psychological theories: social identity 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986), social comparison (Festinger 1954), and 
reference group (Hyman 1942). All three theories operate in the do-
main of judgments and evaluations that people make of one an-
other in social contexts. Social identity theory places primacy on the 
individual’s belonging to and identifying with a particular group 
(e.g., ethnic group), giving rise to the in-group favoritism. Social 
comparison underscores the processes of comparing oneself with 
others along particular dimensions (e.g., monetary wealth). Refer-
ence group theory prioritizes distinct groups (such as local cultural 
elites for a newcomer) in relation to which an individual shapes 
their attitudes, values, and self-appraisals.
It may very well be the case that all three types of phenomena are 
expressions of one basic process. But on the middle range, a strong 
case can be made that the three theories describe distinct “mod-
ules,” sensitive for different inputs and influencing distinct and 
separate forms of social behavior. If this is correct, then a deeper 
focus on the specific applicability of these three “modules” and the 
differences between them across specific empirical fields is likely to 
be more scientifically insightful and pragmatically useful than an 
attempt to construe a GT unifying them all.
Practical principles of middle range theories
Following Merton (1968) and Pawson (2009; 2010; 2013), we sug-
gest that three principles govern development and application of 
middle range theories.
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1: Sufficient level of abstraction
According to Merton (1967, 68), one criteria of useful MRTs is that 
they are “sufficiently abstract... to transcend sheer description or 
empirical generalization.” Good empirical research typically pro-
duces a multitude of details and descriptions that need to be recon-
structed through abstractions or models that maintain transparent 
connection with data. Each MRT identifies phenomena the general-
ity of which, however, are limited to a particular empirical domain 
and scale. It also provides explanations that hold within the specific 
domain or set of domains, without necessarily purporting to pro-
vide universal explanations valid for spatial and temporal scales, 
levels of organization, and historical periods of human activity. So-
cial identity, social comparison, and reference group theories are all 
limited to the domain of interpersonal and group evaluations and 
judgments, and to the scale of higher mental processes (evaluations 
and judgments) and person-group processes.
Empirical and theoretical maturation in a particular research field 
is brought about through (a) development and application of spe-
cific MRTs; (b) identification of their limits and specification of ex-
planatory powers; (c) emergence of a set of MRTs that provide a 
number of distinct perspectives on the chosen domain and (d) fi-
nally MRTs whose primary role is to capture or model phenomena, 
that subsequently are integrated intro higher level MRTs. The does 
not mean that the MRT-perspective entitles a relativist epistemolo-
gy: middle range theories typically share similar explanatory do-
mains and scales and vary in particular “inputs,” “outputs,” and 
theorized mechanisms and observed patterns. Thus, it is incorrect to 
say that a particular empirical field (such as “Janteloven – the un-
spoken rules of interpersonal behavior and evaluation – in Danish 
corporate environments”) can be described through an open range 
of perspectives. Rather, a particular MRT out of a set is best applica-
ble to this field. This means that MRTs are at the same time closely 
tied to empirical investigations and phenomena, and can neither be 
owned by, nor be particular to any specific GT. Instead we should 
expect multitudes of MRTs, each a “tool” developed for particular 
purposes, and often used in combination with other such tools.
Merton himself was vague about what constitutes the ideal level 
of abstraction. We suggest that this vagueness is necessary to pre-
vent dogmatic codification of this approach. Merton himself more 
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than anything wanted to avoid conceptual systems that aspire to 
totality, so abstract as to be seemingly able to encompass every kind 
of process and behavior, without really explaining anything at all.
2: Transparent deduction
Merton writes that middle range theories “consist of limited sets of 
assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived 
and confirmed by empirical investigation” (Merton 1968, 68). He 
thus pinpoints both the manner in which a theory of the middle 
range is constructed, and the core feature of such theories.
Firstly, such theories must consist of a set of clear propositions. 
Secondly, MRTs focus on empirical patterns. Patterns are neither 
laws nor impeccable empirical regularities. Empirical regularities 
in the social world are inherently fuzzy, and even the strongest pat-
tern will sometimes be conspicuously absent. Sometimes even an 
exception might prove the rule. However, theoretically valid em-
pirical regularities should be transparently deductible from middle 
range assumptions and propositions. Subsequently prediction can 
be produced “which is more secure than mere empirical extrapola-
tion from previously observed trends” (Merton 1968, 152).
3: Adaptive confrontation with explanatory failure
Any scientific claim that something might be true also accepts that it 
might be false. Thus, it should be possible to test middle range theo-
ries, and they should be able to fail. “The middle range orientation 
involves the specification of ignorance. Rather than pretend to 
knowledge where in fact it is absent, it expressly recognizes what 
still must be learned in order to lay the foundations for still more 
knowledge.” (Merton 1968, 68). While most GTs claim to adhere 
to some kind of falsifiability, they, as we have seen above with 
Bourdieu, tend to reject empirical criticism. MRTs attempt to ex-
plain empirical patterns that are dynamic, flexible and mutable. 
Over time any research based on theories of the middle range will 
accumulate empirical anomalies. For MRTs, the most productive 
strategy is modification and adaptation, so that the new versions ac-
commodate empirical anomalies and confront these anomalies with 
new methods and techniques. For example, in this fashion behavio-
ral mimicry was first identified in the domain of mental categori-
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zation, and then resolved with an entirely new class of methods 
(Greenwald 2012; White and Poldrack 2013).
Conclusion
Grand theories are unquestionably appealing for the theoreticians, 
not least for the prospect of the associated fame, and for the gen-
eral public, not least for the shock value and grandeur associated 
with the next profound explanation of the mysteries of humanity. 
However, it appears that thus far middle range theories have had 
a far better survival chance than grand theories. Even GTs survive 
best when “demoted” to MRT level: thus, Bourdieu’s “reproduc-
tion” seems to work best in education studies, after being formally 
specified to focus narrowly on the “different mechanisms through 
which [measurable] cultural capital leads to [measurable] educa-
tional and socioeconomic success” (Jæger and Breen 2016, 1081).
Perhaps the biggest paradox in GT development is the oft-stated 
fear of reductionism (for instance, “reductionism of the psyche to 
brain processes” is a favorite argument in many humanistic psy-
chologies). Yet ironically, the grandeur of GT claims often results in 
nothing less than reductionism to the grandest possible level – a 
fate suffered, for instance, by phenomenology which attempted to 
place a (conscious) subject in the center of human existence. This 
thinking subject is typically assumed to have (perhaps with some 
training in phenomenological introspection) complete and privi-
leged access to the content of their own holistic and indivisible con-
sciousness. Critical examination of phenomenology, however, has 
shown that consciousness is famously murky and subjects don’t 
seem to have a clear idea even about the basic qualia such as the 
color of their dreams (Schwitzgebel 2011), while decades of neu-
ropsychological research have shown how entire swaths of con-
sciousness can be altered or destroyed by brain damage. It turned 
out that the mind cannot be effectively reduced to classical phe-
nomenological subject.
Perhaps eventually humanity will arrive at a unified theory of 
human mind, social interactions, and society, just as it has seem-
ingly zeroed in on the basics of physics (though even in physics the 
unified field theory, for instance, is still out of reach). For the time 
being, we suggest that human sciences would be well served by 
suspending their fascination with grand schemas and by engaging 
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in middle range theorizing in tight connection with exciting new 
methods and new and established empirical fields. For many sci-
entists (as the authors of this article have learned), this might be a 
truly liberating experience.
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